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ABSTRACT 
Large private investments in biofuels are presently underway in Mozambique. This paper uses an 
economywide model to assess the implications of these investments for growth and income distribution. 
Our results indicate that biofuels provide an opportunity to enhance growth and poverty reduction. 
Overall, the proposed biofuel investments increase Mozambique’s annual economic growth by 0.6 
percentage points and reduce the incidence of poverty by about six percentage points over the 12-year 
phase-in period. However, the benefits depend on production technology. Our results indicate that an 
outgrower approach to producing biofuels is more pro-poor, due to the greater use of unskilled labor and 
accrual of land rents to smallholders in this system, compared with the more capital-intensive plantation 
approach. Moreover, the expected benefits of outgrower schemes will be further enhanced if they result in 
technology spillovers to other crops.  
Keywords: biofuels, economic growth, poverty, developing countries, Mozambique 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Mozambique is a land-abundant country, with only one sixth of its 30 million hectares of arable land 
currently under cultivation. The land remains state-owned, and use rights must be requested from the 
state. As a country with significant untapped agricultural potential, Mozambique has captured the interest 
of biofuel investors. Currently, the government has pending use-rights requests for more than 12 million 
hectares, with nearly all of the requests relating to biofuels. The specific crops being considered are 
sugarcane and sweet sorghum for the production of ethanol, and jatropha for the production of biodiesel.  
Biofuel production in Mozambique is considered profitable at world oil prices above US$70 per 
barrel (Econergy, 2008). Rising interest in biofuel production therefore reflects the current surge in world 
oil prices, as well as the desire to cut down on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions particularly in European 
countries. These two factors are driving investor interest. Mozambique’s government also views biofuels 
as an opportunity to increase economic growth and exports, as well as encourage rural development and 
poverty reduction. However, this raises a series of policy questions. 
• Will lower-income people benefit from large-scale biofuel investments? 
• What are the implications of producing on a plantation basis compared to contracting 
smallholder farmers? 
• What is the demand for complementary investments, such as roads and ports? 
• Are there potential threats to food security if biofuels displace food production? 
• Should the government be concerned about the stability of world biofuel prices? 
This paper examines some of these questions using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model of Mozambique. Since it is not possible to address all of the issues associated with biofuels using a 
single framework, we focus on the impact of biofuel investments on economic growth and income 
distribution. We also compare plantation and outgrower approaches to producing biofuels. Finally, we 
consider the relationship between food crops and the biofuel sector.  
Four sections follow this introduction. First, relevant information on the Mozambican country 
context is presented, followed by a brief review of the biofuel-related literature. The CGE modeling 
framework and results are then presented. A final section concludes and discusses policy implications and 
directions for future research.  
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2.  AGRICULTURE AND RURAL POVERTY IN MOZAMBIQUE 
While the situation in Mozambique has improved over the past 10 years, it remains sobering, particularly 
in rural areas where approximately 70 percent of the total population resides. About half of rural 
inhabitants are considered absolutely poor, meaning that they have difficulty acquiring basic necessities, 
such as sufficient food for meeting caloric requirements (Arndt and Simler, 2007). Rural dwellers, 
especially the poor, depend heavily on crop agriculture for their incomes. However, crop technologies are 
generally rudimentary and agricultural value-added remains concentrated in cassava, maize and beans. 
Only a small minority of rural households use improved seeds, fertilizers and pesticides (Uaiene, 2008). 
While the urban centers tend to be more diverse, agriculture remains the single largest employment sector 
for urban dwellers. Thus, despite being a key economic sector, agriculture remains underdeveloped, with 
negative consequences for both rural and urban populations.  
Widespread rural poverty does not stem from a lack of agricultural potential.1 On the contrary, 
agricultural conditions in Mozambique are considered to be favorable (Diao et al., 2007). However, low-
yield technologies are typically employed and vast tracts of high-quality land remain unexploited. Water 
resources, in the form of multiple rivers, are also abundant and underexploited. Furthermore, the 
country’s long coastline and multiple harbors open towards the dynamic markets of Asia and into 
expanding regional markets. Given such potential, a number of explanations exist for the 
underdevelopment of agriculture, including binding labor constraints within this land-abundant country, 
as well as inadequate investments in agricultural technologies and rural infrastructure. Private (foreign) 
investments in biofuels may thus provide an opportunity to exploit available resources and increase the 
contribution of agriculture to exports and economic growth.  
Overall, Mozambican agriculture can be divided into two parts. On the one hand there exists a 
large and mainly subsistence-oriented sector focused on food crop production; this sector uses 
rudimentary technology and is subject to high levels of volatility. On the other hand, there is a small but 
growing commercial sector that is driven by external investment. Despite growth, the commercial sectors 
small size has implied only a small contribution to overall growth and poverty reduction.  
Investments in commercial agriculture have occurred through two kinds of institutional 
arrangements. First, the tobacco and cotton sectors have been successful in using vertically-coordinated 
arrangements with smallholders. Beyond the immediate benefits to smallholders (i.e. income obtained 
from sale of cash crops), considerable evidence suggests the existence of technology spillovers, whereby 
farmers associated with outgrower schemes (and their neighbors) adopt improved technologies for other 
crops (Strasberg, 1997; Benfica, 2006; Uaiene, 2008). The second arrangement is that of production on a 
plantation basis, as is seen in the sugarcane sector. Employees on plantations have typically fared better 
than workers dependent on subsistence-oriented agriculture. However, the plantation approach has not 
been associated with technology spillovers and has failed to generate many jobs for farm laborers. Thus, 
while biofuels represent investments on a larger scale than existing traditional exports, the institutional 
arrangement of these new investments, including the associated production technology vectors and 
spillovers, will have strong implications for the character of growth. Accordingly, we focus on the impact 
of proposed biofuel investments under alternative  institutional structures.  
 
                                                     
1Historical factors involving the character of Portuguese colonization, a failed socialist experiment, and a vicious civil war 
that lasted until 1992 contributed to Mozambique earning the label of “poorest country in the world” in the early 1990s (Arndt, 
Jensen & Tarp, 1998). Most indicators point to substantial improvements since that time. However, the low starting point implies 
the necessity of rapid improvement for extended periods to achieve even the averages for developing countries. 
 3 
 
3.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
With oil prices projected to remain well above US$70 per barrel for the foreseeable future (IEA, 2007), 
biofuel production is expected to remain profitable and grow dramatically. However, the implications of 
this growth are less clear. Optimists, such as Ricardo Hausmann, Director of the Center for International 
Development at Harvard University, foresee a world in which biofuels blunt the monopoly power of 
OPEC, thus leading to a stabilization of world fuel prices at approximately the marginal cost of biofuel 
production (Hausmann, 2007). Hausmann also views biofuels as being net positive for growth and 
development, particularly in Africa and Latin America, due to the large land endowments of these 
continents. Compared with the natural resource-extractive industries that often dominate investment, 
especially in Africa, biofuel production technologies tend to be more labor-intensive and hence more pro-
poor. In addition, biofuel production requires general investment in roads and port infrastructure, as 
opposed to the dedicated investments normally associated with resource extraction. As a result, biofuel 
investments will “crowd in” other investments due to improvements in the transport infrastructure.  
Others, such as Oxfam (2007), are less sanguine. They point to the rise in food prices, and 
concomitant aggravation of poverty, particularly urban poverty, that has already been associated with 
shifts to biofuel production. In addition, while recognizing the potential of biofuel production to provide 
market outlets for poor farmers and generate rural employment, they are concerned that biofuel 
plantations will take land from smallholders, employ capital-intensive technologies, and pay substandard 
wages.  
The environmental implications of biofuel production are also the subject of debate. Biofuels 
have often been pointed to as a means for reducing GHG emissions. This is because plant biomass 
captures carbon from the air. Conversion of this biomass to biofuel and subsequent combustion returns 
the carbon to the air, thus creating a cycle (Hazell and Pachauri, 2006). However, this cycle is not 
completely closed, as biofuels require energy for their growth, processing, and transportation, thus 
implying positive net emissions. Pimentel (2003) calculates that the energy balance of ethanol from corn 
is actually negative. However, these calculations are disputed by Graboski and McClelland (2002), and 
the bulk of the evidence indicates that biofuels, particularly those derived from the more efficient crops, 
are a substantial net energy contributor. 
More serious concerns regarding environmental impacts, including GHG emissions, center on 
land use. Recent work by Fargione et al. (2008) indicates that GHG reduction from biofuel use compared 
with that of fossil fuel depends upon land use and the source of land used for biofuel production. In 
particular, clearing new land for biofuel production can generate large emissions of GHGs (particularly 
CO2) due to burning and decomposition of organic matter. Fargione et al. refer to these land-conversion 
emissions as the “carbon debt.” This debt varies by the biome in which the land conversion occurs and the 
crop planted for biofuel production. In the case of production of sugarcane for ethanol on land cleared 
from Brazilian Cerrado, they estimate that it would take 17 years to repay this debt (in other words, 17 
times the carbon savings per year from using the produced ethanol versus gasoline equals the carbon 
debt). The payback periods for some other biomes and crops are even longer.  
These observations are pertinent because biofuel optimists, such as Hausmann, assume that the 
global land area currently under production can be expanded by up to 50 percent (from 1.4 billion 
hectares to 2.1 billion hectares) in order to accommodate biofuel production. If dedicated to biofuel, this 
land expansion would generate annual energy roughly equivalent to the energy content of current oil 
production. 
While the biofuel boom has generated considerable discussion on the potential implications for 
poor countries, such debates are supported by relatively few quantitative economic analyses. A review of 
the literature yields no published articles estimating the growth and poverty implications of large-scale 
biofuel investment in a low-income country. In this context, an analysis of Mozambique is useful because 
the concerns of this country reflect many of the key aspects of the debate outlined above. Highly relevant 
issues include the choice of production technology, institutional arrangements in production (plantation 
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versus outgrower), technology spillovers, land area expansion, diversion of resources from food 
production, and complementary investments. In the next section, we develop an economic modeling 
framework that captures the various transmission mechanisms linking biofuels to the above issues.  
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4.  THE MODELING FRAMEWORK AND RESULTS 
Background on CGE models 
The impact of biofuel investment is simulated using an economywide computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model of Mozambique. This class of model is frequently applied to issues of trade strategy, 
income distribution, and structural change in developing countries. CGE models have a number of 
features that make them suitable for such analysis. First, they simulate the functioning of a market 
economy, including markets for labor, capital and commodities, and provide a useful perspective on how 
changes in economic conditions are mediated through prices and markets. Secondly, the structural nature 
of these models permits consideration of new phenomena, such as biofuels. Thirdly, CGE models assure 
that all economywide constraints are respected. For instance, biofuels are expected to generate substantial 
foreign exchange earnings (or savings, as in the case of fuel import substitution), use a large quantity of 
land, and demand a substantial amount of labor. It is therefore important to consider the balance of 
payments and the supply of useable land and labor. Fourthly, CGE models contain detailed sectoral 
breakdowns and provide a “simulation laboratory” for quantitatively examining how different impact 
channels influence the performance and structure of the economy. Finally, CGE models provide a 
theoretically consistent framework for welfare and distributional analysis.  
In CGE models, economic decision-making is the outcome of decentralized optimization by 
producers and consumers within a coherent economywide framework. A variety of substitution 
mechanisms are specified, including substitution between labor types, between capital and labor, between 
imports and domestic goods, and between exports and domestic sales, all of which occur in response to 
variations in relative prices. Institutional rigidities and imperfect markets are captured by the exogenous 
imposition of immobile sectoral capital stocks, labor market segmentation, and home consumption; this 
permits a more realistic application of this class of model to developing countries.  
Experience with CGE models also highlights some disadvantages. An economywide approach is 
not well suited for the analysis of all issues. In striving to develop a comprehensive picture of the entire 
economy, some detail is necessarily suppressed. If a detail highly relevant to the analytical question at 
hand is suppressed, the approach will obviously be poorly suited to the task. Similarly, some issues can be 
adequately addressed with economic frameworks that are less comprehensive, thereby allowing the 
analyst to spend more time on analysis and less time on data issues and modeling. Due to the potential 
scale of biofuel investments and their downstream implications for the whole economy, however, we 
herein adopted a CGE modeling-based approach.  
Mozambique Modeling Framework 
The CGE model of Mozambique contains 56 activities/commodities, including 24 agricultural and 7 
food-processing sectors.2 Five factors of production are identified: three types of labor (unskilled, semi-
skilled and skilled), agricultural land, and the factor capital. This detail captures the structure of the 
economy and will substantially influence the model results. For example, because the produced biofuels 
will either be exported or used to replace fuel imports, substantial increases in biofuel production will 
have implications for foreign exchange availability and hence trade. Due to expanded foreign exchange 
availability, Mozambique will have the capacity to import more and reduce exports of other products 
(besides biofuels). As a result, one might expect sectors with high trade shares (either a large share of 
production exported or a high degree of import competition) to be more strongly affected compared to 
non-traded sectors. The basic structural features of the Mozambican economy are presented in Table 1. 
                                                     
2 The International Food Policy Research Institute’s recursive dynamic model is used (see Thurlow, 2008). 
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Table 1. Structure of Mozambique’s economy in 2003 
 Share of total (%) Export 
intensity 
(%) 
Import 
penetra-
tion (%) 
 GDP Employ-
ment 
Exports Imports 
Total GDP  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 9.7 21.9 
 Agriculture 25.9 50.9 20.3 2.6 9.6 3.3 
   Food crops 18.2 32.6 3.8 2.0 2.2 3.7 
   Traditional exports 1.1 1.7 1.2 0.4 19.5 15.4 
   Other agriculture 6.7 16.6 15.4 0.2 24.4 0.8 
 Manufacturing 13.7 5.0 59.4 70.6 29.9 52.5 
   Food processing 5.0 3.0 2.0 14.3 1.7 23.1 
   Trad. crop proc. 0.9 0.5 3.4 3.6 38.1 51.5 
   Other manufact. 7.8 1.5 54.1 52.7 62.3 75.8 
 Other industries 9.5 15.0 12.5 5.7 9.1 9.0 
 Private services 42.2 26.7 7.7 21.2 2.0 10.9 
 Government services 8.7 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: Mozambique 2003 social accounting matrix (SAM). 
Note: “Export intensity” is the share of exports in domestic output, and “import penetration” is the share of import in total 
domestic demand. 
Within the existing structure and subject to macroeconomic constraints, producers in the model 
maximize profits under constant returns to scale, with the choice between factors governed by a constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Factors are then combined with fixed-share intermediates using a 
Leontief specification. Under profit maximization, factors are employed such that marginal revenue 
equals marginal cost based on endogenous relative prices. 
Substitution possibilities exist between production for domestic and foreign markets. This 
decision of producers is governed by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function that 
distinguishes between exported and domestic goods, and by doing so, captures any time- or quality-
related differences between the two products. Profit maximization drives producers to sell in markets 
where they can achieve the highest returns. These returns are based on domestic and export prices; the 
latter is determined by the world price times the exchange rate adjusted for any taxes. Under the small-
country assumption, Mozambique faces a perfectly elastic world demand curve at a fixed world price. 
The final ratio of exports to domestic goods is determined by the endogenous interaction of the relative 
prices for these two commodity types. 
Further substitution possibilities exist between imported and domestic goods under a CES 
Armington specification. Such substitution can take place both in intermediate and final usage. These 
elasticities vary across sectors, with lower elasticities reflecting greater differences between domestic and 
imported goods. Again under the small country assumption, Mozambique faces infinitely elastic world 
supply at fixed world prices. The final ratio of imports to domestic goods is determined by the cost-
minimizing decision-making of domestic demanders based on the relative prices of imports and domestic 
goods (both of which include the relevant taxes).  
The model distinguishes among various institutions, including enterprises, the government, and 
10 representative household groups. Households are disaggregated across rural/urban areas and national 
income quintiles. Households and enterprises receive income in payment for the producers’ use of their 
factors of production. Both institutions pay direct taxes to the government (based on fixed tax rates), save 
(based on marginal propensities to save), and make transfers to the rest of the world. Enterprises pay their 
remaining incomes to households in the form of dividends. Households, unlike enterprises, use their 
incomes to consume commodities under a linear expenditure system (LES) of demand.  
The government receives income from imposing activity, sales taxes, direct taxes, and import 
tariffs, and then makes transfers to households, enterprises and the rest of the world. The government also 
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purchases commodities in the form of government consumption expenditures, and the remaining income 
of the government is saved (with budgets deficits representing negative savings). All savings from 
households, enterprises, government and the rest of the world (foreign savings) are collected in a savings 
pool from which investment is financed. 
The model includes three broad macroeconomic accounts: the government balance, the current 
account, and the savings-investment account. In order to bring about balance among the various macro 
accounts, it is necessary to specify a set of “macroclosure” rules, which provide a mechanism through 
which macroeconomic balance can be achieved. A savings-driven closure is assumed in order to balance 
the savings-investment account. Under this closure, the marginal propensities of households and 
enterprises to save are fixed, while investment adjusts to income changes to ensure that the level of 
investment and savings are equal. For the current account it is assumed that a flexible exchange rate 
adjusts in order to maintain a fixed level of foreign savings. In other words, the external balance is held 
fixed in foreign currency terms. Finally, in the government account, the fiscal deficit is assumed to remain 
unchanged, with government revenues and expenditures balanced through changes in direct tax rates to 
households and enterprises.  
The CGE model is calibrated to a 2003 social accounting matrix (SAM) (McCool, Thurlow and 
Arndt, forthcoming), which was constructed using information from national accounts, trade and tax data, 
and household income and expenditure data from the 2002 national household survey (INE, 2004). Trade 
elasticities are taken from the Global Trade Analysis Project (Dimaranan, 2006). The model is calibrated 
so that the initial equilibrium reproduces the base-year values from the SAM.  
The features described up to now apply to a basic single-period “static” CGE model. However, 
because biofuel investments will, even under the most optimistic scenarios, unfold over a dozen years or 
more, the model must be capable of moving forward and looking at growth trajectories. Therefore, the 
model must be “dynamized” by building in a set of accumulation and updating rules (e.g. investment 
adding to capital stock, after depreciation; labor force growth by skill category; productivity growth). In 
addition, expectation formations must be specified. Expectation formations represent a major 
distinguishing feature of many macroeconomic models. For the CGE model employed herein, a simple set 
of adaptive expectations rules are chosen, as we view these to be the most appropriate for the 
Mozambican context. We also do not explicitly model crowding-in of private investment in non-biofuel 
sectors, as suggested by Hausmann, opting instead to focus on the direct impact of biofuels. We do, 
however, consider potential technology spillovers. 
A series of dynamic equations are also required to “update” various parameters and variables 
from one year to the next. For the most part, the relationships are straightforward. Growth in the total 
supply of each labor category and land is specified exogenously, sectoral capital stocks are adjusted each 
year based on investment, net of depreciation. Factor returns adjust such that factor supply equals factor 
demand. The model adopts a “putty-clay” formulation, whereby each new investment can be directed to 
any sector in response to differential rates of return, but installed equipment must remain in the same 
sector (e.g. a factory cannot be converted into a railroad). Sectoral productivity growth is specified 
exogenously with the possibility of different rates of productivity growth by factor. Using these simple 
relationships to update key variables, we can generate a series of growth scenarios, based on different 
biofuel investment scenarios.  
The dynamic CGE model also estimates the impact of alternative investment scenarios on 
household incomes. Each household questioned in the 2002 national household survey is linked to its 
corresponding representative household in the CGE model. This is the expenditure-side microsimulation 
component of the Mozambican model. In this formulation, changes in representative households’ 
consumptions and the prices for each commodity in the CGE model are passed down to their 
corresponding households in the survey, where total consumption expenditures are recalculated. This new 
level of per capita expenditure for each survey household is compared to the official poverty line, and 
standard poverty measures are recalculated.  
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It is important to highlight that our focus is on the differential impact across scenarios. From this 
vantage point, what matters most is whether our baseline scenario (which excludes biofuel investment) 
and the various biofuel scenarios are more or less reasonable. Examining the differences among these 
scenarios allows us to isolate the implications of biofuel investments. The modeling is not, however, an 
attempt to forecast particular economic outcomes.  
Baseline Scenario 
We first produce a baseline growth path that assumes that Mozambique’s economy continues to grow 
during 2003-2015 in line with its recent performance. For each time period, we update the model to 
reflect changes in population, labor and land supply, and factor productivity (see Table 2). Since 
Mozambique is a land-abundant country, we assume that land supply grows alongside the population at 
two percent per year. We capture the rising skill intensity of the labor force by allowing the supply and 
productivity of skilled and semi-skilled labor to grow faster than that of unskilled labor.3 There is also 
unbiased technological change in the baseline scenario, with the shift parameter on the production 
function increasing at three percent per year in non-agriculture and 0.8 percent per year in agriculture. 
Together, these assumptions produce a baseline scenario in which the Mozambican economy grows at an 
average of 6.1 percent per year.  
Table 2. Core macroeconomic assumptions and results 
 Initial, 
2003 
Baseline 
scenario 
Sugarcane 
scenario 
Jatropha 
scenario 
Jatropha + 
spillovers 
Combined 
scenario 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (2 + 4) 
  Average annual growth rate, 2003-15 (%) 
Population (1000) 18,301 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
GDP 100.0 6.09 6.41 6.32 6.46 6.74 
  Labor supply 63.9 2.09 2.09 2.09 2.09 2.09 
    Skilled 10.7 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
    Semi-skilled 13.9 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 
    Unskilled 39.3 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
  Capital stock 30.0 6.35 6.75 6.73 6.74 7.14 
  Land supply 6.1 2.00 2.21 2.40 2.40 2.60 
  Final year value, 2015 
Real exchange rate 1.00 0.95 0.89 0.86 0.88 0.81 
Consumer prices 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Cereals price index 1.00 1.20 1.22 1.24 1.19 1.22 
Source: Results from the Mozambican CGE-microsimulation model. Exchange rate index is given in foreign currency units per 
local currency unit (i.e. a decline is an appreciation).  
Biofuel Scenarios 
In the biofuel scenarios, we create dedicated sectors of sugarcane for ethanol production and jatropha for 
biodiesel production. The outputs of these sectors are employed as the raw materials for dedicated 
processing sectors. Beginning from an effectively zero base, we increase the amount of land allocated to 
the biofuel raw material sectors. For all four biofuel sectors, the capital necessary for biofuel production is 
assumed to be 100 percent foreign-financed and is incremental to the foreign investment levels assumed 
                                                     
3 Skilled/semi-skilled labor productivity grows at two/one percent. Total labor force growth is faster than population growth 
because the forecast population growth is below historical rates and the population pyramid is skewed towards the young (nearly 
50 percent of the population is below 15 years old). 
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without biofuels. Returns to biofuel capital are assumed to be repatriated. The resulting biofuel production 
is assumed to be 100 percent exported.4  
The production structures of the two considered crops are different (see Table 3). The proposed 
sugarcane investments in Mozambique are assumed to be plantation-based, whereas jatropha production 
is assumed to be undertaken primarily through smallholder outgrower schemes. Jatropha is thus more 
labor-intensive, requiring almost 50 workers for every 100 hectares planted. Sugarcane requires only 34 
farm laborers for every 100 hectares planted, but it is substantially more capital-intensive, employing 
three times more capital per hectare than jatropha. Relative to the quantity of biofuel produced, jatropha is 
more land-intensive, requiring more than twice as many hectares to produce the same number of liters of 
fuel (biodiesel or ethanol). The technologies for processing both crops into biofuel requires an additional 
two to three workers for every 10,000 liters produced. Overall, jatropha processing is more labor-
intensive, while sugarcane processing is more capital-intensive.5  
Table 3. Biofuel production characteristics 
Production characteristics for biofuels  
   (inputs and outputs per 100 hectares) 
Sugarcane& ethanol Jatropha & biodiesel 
   Land employed (ha) 100 100 
   Crop production (tonnes) 1,500 300 
   Farm workers employed (people) 33.6 49.2 
   Land yield (tonnes / ha) 15.0 3.0 
   Farm labor yield (tonnes / person) 44.7 6.1 
   Land per farm worker (ha / person) 3.0 2.0 
   Capital per hectare (capital unit / ha) 6.6 2.2 
   Labor-capital ratio (persons / 100 units of capital) 5.0 23.0 
   Biofuel produced (liters) 75,000 36,000 
   Processing workers employed (people) 15.6 11.9 
   Feedstock yield (liters / tonne) 50.0 120.0 
   Processing labor yield (liters / person) 4,816 3,018 
Production characteristics for biofuels 
   (inputs and outputs per 10,000 liters) 
  
   Biofuel production (liters) 10,000 10,000 
   Feedstock inputs (tonnes) 200 83 
   Land employed (ha) 13.3 27.8 
   Farm workers employed (people) 4.5 13.7 
   Processing workers employed (people) 2.1 3.3 
   Capital employed (capital units) 80.6 42.9 
Note: The same fundamental production coefficients are depicted per 100 hectares of land and per 10,000 liters of biofuel 
produced.  
The results from the baseline scenario are compared with four biofuel scenarios. In Scenarios 2 
and 3, we expand sugarcane and jatropha production separately. Since a similar amount of biofuels is 
                                                     
4 For the purposes of this exercise, the difference between export of biofuels and import displacement of petroleum (which is 
a purely imported commodity) by biofuels  is very small. 
5 It is worthwhile highlighting that some uncertainty surrounds the figures given in Table 3. The agronomics of jatropha are 
particularly uncertain due to the distinct paucity of experience with the crop in the Southern African region. The figures in Table 
3 are based on the best available information. It may be that a different crop, such as sweet sorghum, will eventually prove itself 
more amenable to outgrower schemes. Nevertheless, the very high degree of interest in sugarcane and jatropha exhibited by 
serious investors leads us to focus our production technology estimations on these two crops. 
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produced in each scenario, this analysis provides a comparison between plantation and smallholder 
biofuel production. As mentioned earlier, Mozambique’s experience with traditional export crops 
suggests that smallholders’ food crop yields may increase following participation in outgrower schemes, 
due to technology spillovers (Strasberg 1997, Benfica, 2006). This may arise from the transfer of better 
farming practices or improved access to fertilizers and other inputs. Scenario 4 captures this possibility by 
repeating the jatropha scenario, but with faster productivity growth for food crops. Finally, in Scenario 5, 
we combine the expansion of both sugarcane and jatropha, including technology spillovers, to assess the 
overall impact of biofuels on growth and poverty in Mozambique.  
In the sugarcane and jatropha scenarios (i.e. Scenarios 2 and 3, respectively) we increase the 
amount of land allocated to these crops by 280,000 and 55,000 hectares, respectively (see Table 4).6 As 
indicated earlier, Mozambique is a land-abundant country. However, access to large contiguous pieces of 
unused land is limited by insufficient road infrastructure, meaning that it is unlikely that biofuel 
investments will be undertaken entirely on new lands. In the biofuel scenarios, we assume that half of the 
production of biofuel crops takes place on unused land, while the remainder occurs on land already under 
cultivation. We therefore reduce the amount of land available for existing crops by half the amount of 
land needed for biofuel crops, and then let the model determine the optimal allocation of the remaining 
land based on the production technologies and relative profitabilities of different crops.  
Table 4. Agricultural production results 
 Initial 
value, 
2003 
Baseline 
value, 
2015 
Deviation from baseline final value, 2015 
 Sugarcane 
scenario 
Jatropha 
scenario 
Jatropha + 
spillovers 
Combined 
scenario 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (2 + 4) 
Total land (1000 ha) 4,482 5,684 140 275 275 415
  Biofuel crops 0 0 280 550 550 830
   Sugarcane 0 0 280 0 0 280
   Jatropha 0 0 0 550 550 550
  Food crops 4,291 5,371 -73 -183 -193 -292
   Maize 1,300 1,597 -62 -122 -96 -180
   Sorgh. & millet 621 666 -2 -6 -20 -19
   Paddy rice 179 225 -13 -24 -20 -37
  Traditional exports 191 313 -67 -92 -82 -123
   Tobacco 17 8 -1 -2 -2 -3
   Sugarcane 27 55 -6 -9 -7 -12
   Cotton 115 216 -59 -78 -72 -105
Production (1000 tons)  
  Biofuel crops   
   Sugarcane 0 0 4,200 0 0 4,200
   Jatropha 0 0 0 1,650 1,650 1,650
  Food crops   
   Maize 1,248 1,949 -52 -107 -5 -103
   Sorgh. & millet 363 497 4 6 14 16
   Paddy rice 200 326 -14 -26 -9 -32
  Traditional exports   
   Tobacco 12 8 -1 -2 -2 -3
   Sugarcane 397 996 -82 -125 -109 -188
   Cotton 116 284 -70 -91 -87 -128
Production (1000 liters)  
   Ethanol 0 0 210,000 0 0 210,000
   Biodiesel 0 0 0 198,000 198,000 198,000
Source: Results from the Mozambican CGE-microsimulation model. 
                                                     
6 This is well below the 13 million hectares of biofuel crop production currently being proposed in Mozambique. However, 
many of these proposals may only be speculative and so the sugarcane and jatropha scenarios provide a more plausible 
assessment of near-term investments.  
 11 
 
The reduction in land available to non-biofuel crops causes a decline in the production of food 
crops, especially cereals, which have relatively high import penetration. Accordingly, both scenarios 
show an increase in cereal prices relative to the baseline (see Table 2). This is most pronounced under the 
jatropha scenario, as this crop requires more land and more labor than sugarcane. Food imports rise in 
response to falling production and rising prices. This is further encouraged by an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate caused by the increase in biofuel exports. However, while food imports replace declining 
domestic production, it is the traditional export crops that suffer most. These crops not only have to 
compete for scarcer land and labor resources, but they also lose competitiveness in international markets 
due to currency appreciation. Food crops, on the other hand, are less affected by appreciation because 
they rely more heavily on domestic markets. Accordingly, the land allocated to traditional exports 
declines by a larger percentage than that allocated to food crops.  
Given its lower input requirements, a larger share of the value-added generated from producing 
jatropha and biodiesel remains on the farm, leading to faster agricultural GDP growth compared to 
plantation-based production of sugarcane (see Table 5). However, land-intensive jatropha production has 
a more detrimental impact on traditional export crops, thereby reducing the supply of inputs for traditional 
export crop processing. While sugarcane and ethanol production has a smaller effect on agricultural 
growth, it has a larger impact on manufacturing and overall GDP growth. This occurs because sugarcane 
and ethanol production uses relatively less labor and land, thereby competing less with other domestic 
activities, and while it requires relatively more capital, this capital is assumed to come from abroad.  
Table 5. Sectoral growth results 
 GDP 
share, 
2003 
Average annual growth rate, 2003-15 (%) 
 Baseline 
scenario 
Sugarcane 
scenario 
Jatropha 
scenario 
Jatropha + 
spillovers 
Combined 
scenario 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (2 + 4) 
Total GDP  100.0 6.09 6.41 6.32 6.46 6.74 
   Agriculture 25.9 4.29 5.13 5.82 6.03 6.69 
     Food crops 18.2 4.29 4.31 4.24 4.54 4.45 
     Trad. exports 1.1 3.53 2.15 1.49 1.68 0.47 
     Biofuel crops 0.0 0.00 na na na na 
     Other agr. 6.7 4.39 4.29 4.10 4.24 4.16 
   Manufacturing 13.7 5.46 6.66 5.71 5.82 6.98 
     Food proc. 5.0 5.54 5.52 5.29 5.51 5.35 
     Trad. proc. 0.9 8.53 6.07 5.21 5.40 3.58 
     Biofuel proc. 0.0 0.00 na na na na 
     Other manu. 7.8 4.99 4.82 4.63 4.67 4.42 
   Other industries 9.5 10.25 9.68 9.44 9.46 8.98 
     Water 0.3 8.71 13.11 11.90 11.99 15.39 
   Private services 42.2 6.17 6.28 6.07 6.20 6.26 
   Govt. services 8.7 5.88 5.96 5.93 6.07 6.04 
Source: Results from the Mozambican CGE-microsimulation model. 
Competition over scarce labor resources also explains some of the decline in non-biofuel GDP 
growth under the biofuel scenarios. Since approximately one worker is required for every three hectares 
of land planted with sugarcane, the expansion of sugarcane production by 280,000 hectares generates jobs 
for 94,000 farm laborers (see Table 6). Similarly, jatropha production employs 271,000 smallholder 
farmers. Biofuel processing employs 36,000 and 55,000 manufacturing jobs for ethanol and biodiesel 
production, respectively. The model assumes that all workers are already engaged in productive activity 
and must therefore be drawn away from other sectors. Under the sugarcane and jatropha scenarios, the 
model results indicate that around half of the labor pulled into biofuel production comes from within the 
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agricultural sector. This captures the labor reallocated to jatropha production by smallholder farmers, as 
well as the migration of farmers off their own land to work as laborers on sugarcane plantations.  
The remaining jobs created by biofuel crop production are filled by workers previously employed 
within the non-agricultural sector. Most of these workers come from the construction and trade services. 
Although the model does not specify separate rural and urban labor markets, it is likely that these workers 
will be drawn from both the rural nonfarm and urban economies. Finally, while the share of agricultural 
workers in the total labor force increases under both the sugarcane and jatropha scenarios, the reallocation 
of labor out of the non-agricultural sectors and into rural farm production is larger for jatropha 
production.  
Table 6. Labor employment results 
 Initial 
employ., 
2003 
Baseline 
employ., 
2015 
Deviation from baseline final employment, 2015 
 Sugarcane 
scenario 
Jatropha 
scenario 
Jatropha + 
spillovers 
Combined 
scenario 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (2 + 4) 
Total (1000s) 3,577 4,586 0 0 0 0 
   Agriculture 1,820 2,484 59 165 127 165 
     Food crops 1,166 1,666 -2 -34 -88 -117 
     Trad exports 60 68 -10 -16 -15 -22 
     Biofuel crop 0 0 94 271 271 365 
     Other agr. 594 750 -23 -56 -41 -60 
   Manufacturing 178 179 20 22 28 50 
     Food proc. 107 91 -3 -10 -6 -10 
     Trad. Proc. 20 27 -9 -12 -11 -16 
     Biofuel proc. 0 0 36 55 55 90 
     Other manu. 52 61 -5 -11 -10 -15 
   Other indust. 537 743 -76 -125 -117 -167 
     Water 9 10 6 3 3 8 
   Private services 955 1,080 -3 -62 -39 -49 
   Govt. services 86 100 1 -1 1 1 
Source: Results from the Mozambican CGE-microsimulation model. 
Compared to sugarcane, jatropha creates more employment opportunities and a larger share of 
additional land returns accrue to smallholder farmers, who in turn spend a larger share of their incomes on 
goods produced domestically and in rural areas. As such, while both sugarcane and jatropha production 
benefits rural households, jatropha production increases incomes the most, especially for lower-income 
households. This is shown by changes in the equivalent variation (EV), which measures welfare 
improvements after controlling for price changes (see Table 7). The results indicate that, in the jatropha 
scenario, welfare improves more for lower-income rural households than for higher-income and urban 
households. This is because jatropha production is more land- and unskilled labor-intensive and the 
resulting increases in these factor returns benefit lower-income and rural households relatively more. In 
contrast, sugarcane production is more capital- and skill-intensive, thereby shifting the relative factor 
prices in favor of higher-income urban households.  
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Table 7. Equivalent variation results 
 Initial per 
capita 
spending, 
2003  
Baseline 
growth, 
2003-15  
Deviation from baseline growth rate, 2003-15 
 Sugarcane 
scenario 
Jatropha 
scenario 
Jatropha + 
spillovers 
Combined 
scenario 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (2 + 4) 
Rural households      
   Quintile 1 1,147 6.36 0.56 1.28 1.65 2.00 
   Quintile 2 1,401 6.47 0.57 1.08 1.42 1.87 
   Quintile 3 1,856 6.59 0.57 0.98 1.31 1.78 
   Quintile 4 2,410 6.84 0.58 0.95 1.24 1.75 
   Quintile 5 4,860 7.52 0.64 0.73 1.00 1.60 
Urban households      
   Quintile 1 1,297 6.31 0.46 0.57 0.98 1.36 
   Quintile 2 1,731 6.95 0.50 0.38 0.74 1.24 
   Quintile 3 2,180 6.72 0.50 0.36 0.72 1.22 
   Quintile 4 3,384 7.64 0.53 0.21 0.51 1.07 
   Quintile 5 11,172 8.74 0.57 0.01 0.25 0.86 
Source: Results from the Mozambican CGE-microsimulation model. 
Uneven distributional impacts are also reflected in poverty outcomes once the income effects 
from the CGE model are passed down to the microsimulation module. Both biofuel scenarios lead to 
significant declines in poverty at the national level (see Table 8). However, rural poverty declines faster 
under the jatropha scenario. Smallholder jatropha production is also twice as effective at reducing poverty 
amongst the poorest rural households, as evidenced by its larger impact on the depth and severity of 
poverty.  
Table 8. Poverty results 
 Initial 
poverty 
rates, 
2003  
Final year poverty rates, 2015 (%) 
 Baseline 
scenario 
Sugarcane 
scenario 
Jatropha 
scenario 
Jatropha + 
spillovers 
Combined 
scenario 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (2 + 4) 
Headcount poverty, P0       
   National 54.07 32.04 29.70 28.45 27.54 26.11 
   Rural 55.29 32.98 30.68 28.54 27.58 26.54 
   Urban 51.47 30.06 27.63 28.26 27.44 25.21 
Depth of poverty, P1       
   National 20.52 10.19 9.29 8.65 8.27 7.61 
   Rural 20.91 10.92 9.98 9.02 8.66 8.07 
   Urban 19.69 8.67 7.83 7.88 7.43 6.64 
Severity of poverty, P2       
   National 10.33 4.59 4.12 3.77 3.58 3.27 
   Rural 10.67 5.09 4.59 4.08 3.90 3.61 
   Urban 9.62 3.53 3.13 3.11 2.90 2.55 
Source: Results from the Mozambican CGE-microsimulation model. 
The impact of jatropha on poverty is even more pronounced when we account for technology 
spillovers. In the spillovers scenario, we again allocate 550,000 hectares to jatropha production, with half 
of production taking place on previously unused land. However, we now raise the total factor productivity 
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(TFP) growth rate for food crops by an additional 0.5 percentage points per year during 2003-2015. 
Viewed in partial factor productivity terms, the average maize yield increases from 0.96 to 1.22 tons per 
hectares under the baseline scenario, but rises to 1.30 tons per hectare under the spillover scenario. 
Similar productivity improvements are imposed on other cereals, root crops and vegetables. The result is 
a reversal in the decline of food crop production (see Table 5) and a rise in food prices relative the 
baseline scenario (see Table 2). Improving yields also reduces the amount of land needed to produce food 
crops, thereby alleviating some of the resource competition between traditional export and biofuel crops 
(see Table 4). This accelerates agricultural growth and poverty reduction for both rural and urban 
households, with the latter benefiting from lower food prices. This scenario highlights the benefits of 
technology spillovers from producing biofuels through outgrower schemes, as well as the continued 
importance of improving non-export crop productivity.  
In the final scenario, we combine the effects of jatropha and sugarcane production. The results 
indicate that biofuel production has a substantial impact on the Mozambican economy. GDP growth 
accelerates by 0.65 percentage points per year. This growth acceleration is concentrated in the agricultural 
and manufacturing sectors, which grow by 2.4 and 1.5 percentage points per year, respectively (see Table 
5). Biofuel crop production and processing creates 455,000 jobs, most of which are filled by workers 
from the construction and trade services (see Table 6). The national poverty headcount declines by an 
additional 5.9 percentage points by 2015, which is equivalent to lifting an additional 1.4 million people 
above the poverty line. At the same time, the macroeconomic impact of rapid export-led growth is a 
sharper appreciation of the real exchange rate. This again increases import competition in domestic 
markets and reduces the competitiveness of existing exports, especially traditional export crops. This may 
lead to short-term adjustment costs as farmers reallocate their land and workers migrate between sectors 
and regions.  
Displaced Investment and Relative Poverty Impacts 
A national CGE model cannot consider regional development issues. Inevitably, biofuel production will 
concentrate in particular regions, with consequent implications for the patterns of public investment. For 
instance, biofuel production will require accompanying investment in transportation infrastructure, such 
as roads and ports. In the results presented above, the model implicitly assumes that existing budgets 
accommodate these needs. However, if investment is displaced to biofuel-producing regions, then other 
regions many experience a reduction in such investments.  
We suggest three possible outcomes for this redirection of investment. First, regions not 
producing biofuels grow less rapidly, and these reductions in growth are not offset by increases 
elsewhere. In this case, the biofuel scenarios overstate the economywide gains from biofuel production. 
Secondly, regions not producing biofuels grow less rapidly but these reductions are entirely offset by 
incremental growth beyond the biofuel sectors in the biofuel regions. As pointed out by Hausmann, the 
use of transport infrastructure is non-exclusive (up to a capacity point). Thus, the extra investment in 
transport infrastructure for biofuel regions may well crowd-in additional economic activity, which could 
offset the activity foregone in the non-biofuel regions. In this case, the scenarios correctly project the 
economywide gains, but the national framework masks some regional disparities. Finally, regions not 
producing biofuels grow less rapidly but these reductions are more than offset by incremental growth 
beyond the biofuel sectors in the biofuel regions. This could occur if agglomeration economies or other 
spillover effects induce a crowding-in of a greater level of economic activity than was foregone in the 
non-biofuel regions. In this case, the benefits of biofuels are understated and the actual regional 
disparities are more pronounced. In the absence of a solid foundation for any particular outcome, we rerun 
the above scenarios under the assumption that the additional required public investment is raised via a 
proportional increase in commodity taxes and direct income taxes. These investment scenarios produced 
qualitatively similar results to the biofuel scenarios presented above.7  
                                                     
7 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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We have also not considered a counterfactual scenario in which Mozambique’s government 
invests in alternative agricultural sectors, such as smallholder food crops. Thurlow (2008) compares the 
growth and poverty-reduction effects of alternative sources of agricultural growth in Mozambique and 
finds that biofuel crops are not the most pro-poor source of agricultural growth relative to other crops. For 
instance, the poverty-growth elasticity of biofuel crops is -0.43, which is significantly smaller than the 
elasticities for maize (-0.73), sorghum and millet (-0.65), and horticulture (-0.48). However, biofuel crops 
have far higher growth potential, allowing them to generate larger absolute poverty reductions than 
existing food and traditional export crops.  
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5.  CONCLUSIONS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
Our model results suggest that biofuels can provide Mozambique with an opportunity to substantially 
enhance economic growth and poverty reduction. Both modes of production considered here, ethanol 
produced from sugarcane grown using a plantation approach and biodiesel produced from jatropha using 
an outgrower approach, are projected to increase production and welfare and reduce poverty. However, 
the outgrower approach, as represented by jatropha, is much more strongly pro-poor due to greater use of 
unskilled labor and the accrual of land rents to smallholders rather than plantation owners. The growth 
and poverty reduction benefits of outgrower schemes are further enhanced if the schemes result in 
technology spillovers to other crops.  
Large-scale biofuel production unavoidably imposes adjustments on other sectors due to 
competition for land and labor and the implications of increased foreign exchange availability on the real 
exchange rate. In relative terms, traditional export crops shrink the most relative to the baseline scenario 
in order to make space for biofuels. However, the allocated areas and production levels of food crops also 
decline, while food prices and imports increase relative to the baseline. Overall, while welfare and food 
security broadly increase due to enhanced purchasing power, certain households may be adversely 
affected due to the price and quantity adjustments associated with rapid growth in biofuel production.  
These results suggest that careful attention should be paid to the labor intensities of the 
production methods employed for biofuel crops. The model indicates that the degree of labor intensity has 
the potential to influence the distribution of income. In addition, certain institutional structures that 
increase the probability of technology spillovers to other crops (such as outgrower schemes) are shown to 
be highly desirable. 
At current prices for fossil fuels, biofuel production for export is clearly competitive. There is 
little need to provide additional incentives for biofuel investment. At the same time, any insistence on a 
solely outgrower model may not be the best approach, as investors may strongly prefer vertically-
coordinated arrangements that supply a more certain flow of raw material. A hybrid approach wherein the 
initial investment occurs in plantation mode up to a certain threshold, beyond which further expansion of 
biofuel crops follows an outgrower arrangement, merits careful consideration.  
There are numerous topics for further research, four of which are described in the following. 
First, water usage is not considered explicitly in the model. While irrigation is not strictly necessary for 
jatropha, sugarcane typically requires irrigation and therefore has implications for water resources. The 
large increase in water demand caused by biofuel crops is reflected in the water sector’s high growth 
following new biofuel investments (see Table 5). Second, the model does not consider the potential 
spillovers to other exporting sectors due to increases in transport and other infrastructures required by 
biofuel production (i.e. the crowding-in highlighted by Hausmann, 2007). Such spillovers from foreign 
direct investment would enhance the benefits from biofuel production, thereby justifying concomitant 
public investment vis-à-vis other investment opportunities.  
Third, the implications of converting unused land to biofuel production should be considered in 
the context of GHG emissions. It is likely that the mode of conversion and the crops planted for biofuels 
could substantially influence the GHG emission balance. As a perennial crop, it is possible that jatropha 
possesses significant advantages over other sources of biofuel crops in terms of overall GHG balance, due 
to relatively mild emissions as a result of conversion of new land. This is important. If Mozambican 
biofuel production is demonstrably “green” in terms of CO2 balance, it is more likely to receive a 
premium in international markets. A demonstrably green label is also likely to serve as a significant 
buffer to any downside price risk. While fossil fuel and biofuel prices are currently high and appear 
unlikely to fall substantially over the medium term, this situation is not guaranteed to continue 
indefinitely. Finally, other methods for mitigating downside price risk for biofuels, such as generation of 
electricity and identification of potential substitute crops for biofuels, should also be considered in greater 
detail.  
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